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Altering the Balance Between State Sovereignty and
Competition: The Impact of Seminole Tribe
on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine
SUSAN BETH FARMER*

To paraphrase Justice Stevens' dissent in Seminole Tribe,' both the
Seminole Tribe case and the antitrust laws are about power in different
senses. Seminole Tribe "power" is the power of federal courts to assert
jurisdiction over state governments.2 The antitrust laws are concerned
about market power; the power of firms to raise prices, to fix prices, to
eliminate competition, and to cause injury in business or property.' The
State Action Immunity Doctrine in antitrust law, which has been
incrementally developed by the federal courts over the past fifty-three
years,4 is likely to undergo a significant change in the wake of the Seminole
Tribe decision, which bars all suits against states whether or not the
traditional requirements of the antitrust doctrine have been met.5 The State
* Assistant Professor, Dickinson School of Law. B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Vanderbilt
University School of Law. The constructive comments and discussions with Professors Peter Carstensen,
Andrew Gavil, Gary Gildin, Edward Janger, Christine Kellett, Robert Lande, Michael Mogill, as well
as H. Steven Harris and the other members of the ANTITRUST intemet discussion group, who dqbated
the significance of the case in cyberspace, and the assistance of my research assistant Joanna Taft are
greatfully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
precludes Congress from authorizing suits against States pursuant to federal statutes enacted pursuant to
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, and overruling Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989). Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment
under section 5 of that amendment).
2. Seminole Tribe "power" is the "power of the Congress of the United States to create a private
federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right." 116 S. Ct.
1114, 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. Market power "is the ability [of a seller] profitably to maintain prices above competitive
levels for a significant period of time [or to decrease competition in other areas such as quality,
innovation, or services]." Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1159, at S-3 (Special Supp. Apr. 2, 1992). It is the power of
firms to raise or maintain prices above competitive levels, or to prevent already high prices from
decreasing to competitive levels, or to restrict output or limit new entry. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966);
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, 64 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1608, at S-3 n.8 (Special Supp. Apt.l, 1993).
4. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (the first case announcing the doctrine). The basic
substantive antitrust statutes, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, are broad and general, requiring the federal courts to
construct the antitrust laws. "Just as the courts have created and developed the law of contracts and torts
with, to be sure, occasional or substantial intervention by the legislature, so also the federal courts have
created a complex and intricate body of antitrust law based on a few dozen words in the several
governing statutes." 1 PHIL11P E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 103d2 (rev.
ed. 1997) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP].
5. "Midcal and Parker make clear that federal antitrust law allows the states to depart from the
ordinary market principles underlying the Sherman Act (1) if the state really wants to displace federal
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Action Doctrine immunizes only that anticompetitive activity imposed and
supervised by states. Thus, the State Action Doctrine is likely to be
transformed into an antitrust exemption for private party defendants only,
while state governmental entities will be completely protected from suit in
federal court by Constitutional sovereign immunity.
The antitrust State Action immunity doctrine requires courts to balance
two fundamental, and sometimes conflicting, policies: Competition, the
rationale of the antitrust laws, and state sovereignty, which includes the
power to supplant the competitive market and impose anticompetitive
regulations. To balance these two policies, the State Action Doctrine
mandates courts to investigate the commitment of state government to
challenged regulations and state policies, and to determine whether the state
has genuinely exercised its sovereign interests in supplanting competition.
If so, then the State Action Doctrine provides that state sovereignty triumphs
over competition. If, on the other hand, the state was not sufficiently
committed to its regulatory policy to demonstrate its intent in legislation and
to actively supervise the activity, then application of the antitrust laws would
not trench upon state sovereignty, so competitive interests could safely be
given precedence.6 Thus, the antitrust doctrine evaluates the challenged
state activity to assess whether it is truly the act of a sovereign as a method
to balance the goals of promoting competition and respecting state
sovereignty. That balancing process, which authorized courts to analyze the
intent of state legislatures and the authenticity of state supervision of its
regulations, necessarily allowed states, state agencies and departments to be
sued in federal court under the antitrust laws and to be found liable if the
state failed to meet the judicial test for State Action immunity.
The Seminole Tribe decision views state sovereignty under the Eleventh
Amendment as a policy of overriding importance, not subject to being
weighed against any other competing interest such as competition.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment will trump the antitrust State Action
Doctrine. It immunizes states from private antitrust suits in federal court
without any inquiry into whether the state was acting as a true sovereign or
whether application of the antitrust laws would interfere with governmental
interests.

antitrust law and manifests that policy choice through an affirmative and clearly articulated expression
and (2) if the resulting private power is actively supervised by public officials." AREEDA &
HOVENKAMp, supra note 4, 217.
6. Id. % 224-226 (discussing the reasons for requiring active state supervision of a state
regulatory scheme and a clear expression of state intent to supplant the antitrust laws in order for state
action immunity to be appropriate).
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The actual impact upon states themselves is likely to be felt in
relatively few cases because few antitrust cases have named state entities as
defendants and fewer still have awarded relief. However, the decision will
have a potentially important impact upon private firms that act pursuant to
state statutes that supplant competition and thus claim State Action
immunity, and upon persons injured in their "business or property"7 by state
policies that limit competition. Finally, although Seminole Tribe was not an
antitrust case, its decision on state sovereign immunity will alter
governmental and private relationships under the antitrust laws in two ways:
First, in the balance of power between the states and the Federal
Government and secondly, the liability of states to persons harmed by state
government policies affecting competition.
Finally, the Seminole Tribe decision will have an impact on two groups
- those private actors that seek antitrust immunity and those persons harmed
by conspiracies involving state policies or regulations. In the future, the
State Action Doctrine will apply to private parties and broader Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity to states.
The issue in the Seminole Tribe case was whether Congress had
abrogated Florida's Eleventh Amendment immunity so the state could be
sued, and whether it had the power to do so. 8 The Court decided that,
although the answer to the first issue was in the affirmative,9 it was
irrelevant because Congress lacked any such power.' ° The analysis of the
first issue, heretofore, required a clear and unequivocal statement of
congressional purpose." Although the majority agreed that there was such
a clear statement in the Seminole Tribe case," the antitrust laws are not so
clear. The Clayton Act specifically authorizes federal courts to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 3 but does not
explicitly contemplate a state, as state, as a party defendant. Thus, the

7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States... without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained .... " 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
8. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996).
9. Id. at 1124.
10. Id. at 1131.
ii. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
12. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7)(A)(i) authorizes suit in the
United States District Court for any cause of action concerning a failure by a State to negotiate, in good
faith or at all, with an Indian tribe on the subject of a gaming compact. Subsection (B)(i) describes the
procedures and remedies available under the Act, including placing certain burdens of proof on "the
State," providing for mediation among parties including states, and contemplating that states would be
named as defendants in litigation to enforce the Act.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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antitrust laws do not contain such a clear statement of intent to subject states
to federal court jurisdiction and liability. 4
The second, and critical issue in the Seminole Tribe case was whether
Congress's abrogation of state sovereign immunity was done "'pursuant to
a valid exercise of power.""..5 The only issue is whether "the Act in
question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the
power to abrogate?"' 6 This power has been found pursuant to only two
Constitutional provisions; the Fourteenth Amendment 7 and the Commerce
Clause.' 8 Since the antitrust laws were enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, the issue here, whether Congress could abrogate Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity pursuant to its power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States...,,19 is
important for the future of the State Action Doctrine. Less than a decade
ago in Union Gas, the Cour2 held that the power to abrogate sovereign
immunity was as crucial to the Commerce Clause as to the Fourteenth
Amendment.2' However, in Seminole Tribe the Court found "no principled
distinction" between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate
' the Court
Commerce Clause,"22
overruled Union Gas and decided that
neither section of the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.2 3
14. As is discussed below, the requirements of the clear statement rule are likely not met in the
antitrust laws. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. The more important issue, however, is
whether Congress has the power, if it chose, to subject states to antitrust liability.
15. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
16. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125 (emphasis added).
17. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-55 (1976) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
expanded the federal govemment's power and effectively changed the federal-state balance of power
originally reflected in the Constitution. By giving Congress the authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment itself gave Congress the authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.).
18. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
20. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the decision was by a plurality, and that Justice White,
whose vote made up the plurality, concurred in the judgment but "wrote separately in order to indicate
his disagreement with the majority's rationale." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127.
21. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19-20 (absent "the authority to render States liable in damages,"
Congress's power to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause would not be complete.).
22. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127.
23. Id. at 1128. The Court noted that "[olur willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has
been particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through legislative action
is practically impossible."' Id. at 1127 (citation omitted). The majority found that principles of stare
decisis did not require adherence to Union Gas for four reasons; first, a numerical majority of that Court
disagreed with the plurality's reasoning so the case was of little precedential value, second, it was an
interpretation of the Constitution, third, its "rationale depart[s] from our established understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment" and finally, it frustrates the purpose of Article III. Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).
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In summary, the majority held that principles of sovereign immunity
reflected, but not explicitly stated, in Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment preclude Congress from subjecting states to suit, in law or
equity,2 4 without their consent."
The effect of this broadly written
decision appears to eliminate virtually all private suits against states filed
under federal statutes that provide for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The majority opinion could be read to free states to ignore the
gamut of federal laws enforceable exclusively in federal court. The
majority, however, pointed out three means to force state compliance with
federal law: Suits against states by the Federal Government, Ex parte Young
suits against state officials to enjoin their compliance with federal law, and
Supreme Court review of state court decisions decided under federal law
against states that consented to be sued in state court.26 This last method
is clearly not an option under the antitrust laws, because the United States
District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases brought under the
Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.27 Specifically referring to antitrust
cases against states, the majority observed that "it has not been widely
thought that the federal antitrust... statutes abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under any
of those statutory schemes . . ."" Although it is not clear whether relief
in the form of an injunction was awarded, in at least one leading antitrust
case, the Supreme Court found that a state entity, the Virginia State Bar,
was not immune when it provided for the enforcement of a county bar
".

24. Despite its explicit language covering suits for damages and equitable relief, the Eleventh
Amendment has been construed to allow suits against states for injunctive relief. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974). Justice Stevens had "great difficulty with [such] a construction of the Eleventh
Amendment" but recognized that Edelman had construed the Amendment to allow such suits. Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).

25. Except as to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The
majority referred to sovereign immunity as a "background principle . . . embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment," id. at 1131, and pointed out that "we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the
text of the Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of."' Id. at 1130 (citation omitted).
26. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 nn.14 &16. Justice Souter, dissenting, described these
options as "pretty cold comfort" recognizing that federal law enforcement resources are not unlimited,
federal appellate review is dependent on state consent to state court litigation (which is not an option in
Sherman Act cases in any event), and the Ex parte Young injunction could itself be limited by a future
Court. Finally, he correctly noted that private litigation to enforce federal laws has been an important
part of many federal statutory schemes. Id. at 1172. The Court has recognized the key role of such
"private Attorneys General" in antitrust cases. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284
(1990) (Stating that "[p]rivate enforcement of the Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral
part of the congressional plan for protecting competition.").
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1997).
28.

Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.16.
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minimum fee schedule.29 Moreover, the majority continued, "the antitrust
laws have been in force for over a century, there is no established tradition
in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes
against the States. '3' As discussed below, this conclusion is too narrow. 31
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
characterized the decision as "hold[ing] for the first time since the founding
of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State to the
jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a
federal right. 3 2 Tracing the development of the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity from the pre-Constitutional era, he argued that "the adoption of
the Constitution made them [the States] members of a novel federal system
that sought to balance the States' exercise of some sovereign prerogatives
delegated from their own people with the principle of a limited but
centralizing federal supremacy., 33 Further, the dissent argued that "[g]iven
the Framers' general concern with curbing abuses by state governments, it
would be amazing if the scheme of delegated powers embodied in the
Constitution had left the National Government powerless to render the States
judicially accountable for violations of federal rights." 4 The dissenters
recognized that Congress has infrequently sought to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, particularly in situations other than to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, but maintained that the power to do so in appropriate cases is
critical to the federal system. Moreover, the dissent viewed the historical
evidence as showing that the Constitution did not intend to deny Congress
the power to create federal rights and to authorize private parties to enforce
Criticizing the majority's reliance on
them, even against states."
"background principles" and "implicit limitations" at odds with the text of
the Constitution and intent of the Framers, Justice Souter concluded that the
Constitution neither mandates state sovereign immunity in federal question

29. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975). Certainly most antitrust actions
involving the state action defense seek treble damages against a private defendant. However, the state
action doctrine does not foreclose antitrust actions against state governments, and courts may reject
immunity asserted by state defendants. Id. at 791-92 ("The State Bar [a named defendant] ... has
voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot
claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.").
30. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132 n.16.
31. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
32. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132 n.16.

33. Id. at 1169.
34. Id. at 1171. He concluded that "... of course the Framers did not understand the scheme
to leave the government powerless." Id.
35. Id. at 1173-74.
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cases nor denies Congress the power to subject states to suits in federal
court to enforce federal causes of action. a6
The antitrust laws were enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause"
and thus the State Action Doctrine, which provides only limited immunity
for states and state entities, is plainly implicated by the language of the
majority. Criticizing the decision as "a sharp break with the past," Justice
Stevens, dissenting, observed that the majority ". . . prevents Congress from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against states, from
those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy,
38
environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.
The regulation Justice Stevens was referring to include, of course, antitrust
and trade regulation. Indeed, he stated that "[a]s federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under these federal laws [including the
antitrust laws], the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment
shields States from being sued under them in federal court suggests that
persons harmed by state violations of federal . . . antitrust laws have no
remedy. t939
Two Eleventh Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court this
term follow the Seminole Tribe majority view of state sovereign immunity.
In Regents of the University of California v. Doe,40 a New York citizen
sued the California university and individuals, claiming that the defendants
breached an employment contract to hire him tow ork in a laboratory
operated by the University under contract with the federal Department of
Energy.
The Ninth Circuit had reversed4 a lower court decision
dismissing o sovereign immunity grounds. The majority of the Court of
Appeals found that the defendant University, in its role as manager of the
laboratory, was not entitled to sovereign immunity as an arm of the state
because, by contract, the Federal Government was liable for any judgment
against the university in its performance of the contract. 42 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits and
36. Id. at 1177-78 (citations omitted).
37. "That Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining
trust and monopoly agreements... admits of little, if any, doubt." United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) (citation to legislative history of the Sherman Act omitted). Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
For a discussion of the background of the antitrust laws, see OWEN FiSS, 3 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES; TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-1910 (1993).

38. Seminole Tribe, 116 U.S. at 1134.
39. Id. at 1134 n.l.
40. 117 S. Ct. 900 (1997).
41. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 65 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 774 (finding that "liability for money judgment is the single most important factor in
determining wether an entity is an arm of the state.").
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reversed.43 The Court first re-stated the settled rule that the Eleventh
Amendment is not limited to suits that name a state as defendant, but also
prohibits suits against state agencies and other state entities." While a
state's liability to pay judgments entered against its agencies provides
important information about the relationship between the entity and the state,
such a "formalistic" factor does not determine whether the entity is an arm
of the state. Similarly, the real question for Eleventh Amendment immunity
is whether the entity is potentially liable, not whether it is indemnified or
insured."5 The policy that underlies Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity is to "protect[] the State from the risk of adverse judgments even
though the State may be indemnified by a third party." 6
The other Eleventh Amendment case this term, Idaho v. Coeurd'Alene
Tribe47 was an action by an Indian Tribe against the state of Idaho and a
number of state officials claiming ownerhship of certain submerged lands
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In this 5-4 decision, the
majority opinion acknowledged criticisms of its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence that extends sovereign immunity to suits against states brought
by their own citizens and to federal question cases. 48 However, the Court
adhered to precedent, including last term's Seminole Tribe decision, and to
its "understanding of the Eleventh Amendment as reflecting a broader
principle of sovereign immunity."4' 9 The Court stated that, pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment, states are immune from suits brought by foreign
sovereigns, including the Tribe.5° Part of the original action naming the

43. 117 S. Ct. at 902 (the precise question before the Court was "whether the fact that the Federal
Government has agreed to indemnify a state instrumentality against the costs of litigation, including
adverse judgments, divests the state agency of Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
44. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
Whether or not the state is ultimately responsible for any money judgment against the agency is a
relevant factor in the determination of whether an agency is, or is not, an arm of the state. 117 S. Ct.
at 904.
45. 117 S. Ct. at 904 (observing that a State is no less a sovereign if it obtains tort liability for
slip and fall accidents that may occur on the statehouse steps.).
46. Id. at 905.
47. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
48. Parts I, II-A and III of Justice Kennedy's opinion, which were joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, represent the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined with respect to parts II-B, II-C, and II-D of the opinion. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment and concurring in part.
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented and joined an opinion by Justice Souter.
49. 117 S. Ct. at 2033.
50. Id. at 2034. The remainder of the opinion discussed whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials sued
in their individual capacities. The Court held that it does not.
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State as defendant had been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds and
was not before the Court on certiorari."' The real issue in this case,
whether Ex parte Young authorizes this suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief against state officials, is beyond the scope of this article.
States have been named as defendants in antitrust cases and the State
Action Doctrine was developed to allow limited attacks against
anticompetitive actions by states and state agencies.5 2 The Seminole Tribe
decision, however, eliminates that possibility and protects states from all
suits in federal court unless they waive their sovereign immunity, are said
by the Federal Government or are liable under the Ex parte Young
doctrine. s3
THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE ANTITRUST

STATE ACTIoN IMMUNITY

DOCTRINE
The modem State Action Doctrine represents more than 50 years of
legal development and refinement.5 4 The Doctrine of Limited Immunity
in antitrust actions essentially represents a "workable balance between the
interest of a state in carrying out legitimate regulation of commerce and the
interest of a citizen in obtaining redress for injuries sustained as a result of
unauthorized anticompetitive conduct of state agencies."5 The breadth and
comprehensive language of the antitrust laws demonstrates "a carefully
studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business

51. 117 S.Ct. at 2048 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
52. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
53. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
54. During the first three quarters of a century of Sherman Act jurisprudence, government
antitrust cases were directly appealable from United States District Courts to the United States Supreme
Court pursuant to the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 28. Consequently, the basic antitrust doctrines,
including the State Action Doctrine, were developed by the Supreme Court incrementally in successive
cases. In 1974, the Clayton Act was amended to allow direct appeals in any antitrust cases certified by
the District Court judge to be "of general public importance in the administration of justice. 15 U.S.C.
§ 29(b) (1997). Thus, the framework of the state action doctrine was essentially in place before the
repeal of the Expediting Act in 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3358.
55. H. Stephen Harris & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence Afler
Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes ofAction Over Which the
Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 651 (1988). In addition, the State
Action Doctrine accommodates another balance, that between competition, the goal of the antitrust laws,
and federalism, which defers to state sovereignty. The Court discussed this later balance, stating that
"[c]ommon to the two implied exclusions [including the State Action exemption] was potential conflict
with policies of signal importance in our national traditions and governmental structure of federalism.
Even then, however, the recognized exclusions have been unavailing to prevent antitrust enforcement
which, though implicating those fundamental policies was not thought severely to impinge upon them."
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978).
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whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among
the states."56 In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress exercised the full
extent of its power to regulate commerce and "sought to establish a regime
of competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce in this
country."" Congress also intended to immunize states from antitrust
liability, at least in circumstances in which the state is acting in the role of
the "sovereign" and consciously choosing to supplant competition." The
State Action Doctrine requires courts to strike a balance between
competition and state sovereignty rather than blindly immunizing state actors
sued under the antitrust laws.
There is no basis in the legislative history to conclude, however, that
Congress intended for the courts to create the State Action Doctrine in the
precise terms that have been developed over the century since enactment of
the Sherman Act in 1890. The text of the original governing statutes, the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, is brief and general, no more than a handful of
lines making up two simple sections, one prohibiting monopolization and the
other forbidding restraints of trade, are the crux of the antitrust laws. 9
Summarizing the legislative history of the Sherman Act, Professor Areeda
noted that "[o]n most issues, the legislative background simply fails to
communicate more than the statutory language itself."' The substantive
antitrust rules, including the State Action Immunity Doctrine, are, and were
intended by Congress to be, common law rules that have been developed by
federal courts over the past one hundred years."'
The State Action Doctrine protects "states" and private parties from
antitrust liability in some circumstances. The term "state" necessarily

56. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (in finding that
the insurance business was not excluded from the Sherman Act).
57. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
58. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). However, the Court has recognized that exemptions
from the antitrust laws should not lightly be implied, reasoning that the antitrust laws "establish
overarching and fundamental policies," which counsel against both "repeal by implication" and "implied
exclusions." Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389.
59. 15 U.S.C. § I prohibits "[e]veiy contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, ot attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
or persons, to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony ..
60. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 103d2.
61. Areeda & Hovenkamp further opine that Congress intended the antitrust law to be judge-made
common law, observing that "[niothing else could reasonably have been expected in the judicial
administration of this 'charter of freedom,' as Chief Justice Hughes said of the Sherman Act, written with
a 'generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."' Id.
(citing Appalachian Coals v. United States, 228 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)).
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indicates the judicial62 and legislative6 3 branches of state government as
well as executive departments and agencies." Local governmental entities
also may be immune from antitrust liability under a version of the State
Action exemption."' However, in a critical distinction from Eleventh
Amendment analysis, governmental entities are not immune from the
antitrust laws simply by virtue of their governmental status.66
The State Action Doctrine was first announced 67 in Parker v. Brown,
a 1943 case brought by a California raisin producer against the California
Director of Agriculture W.B. Parker, the Agricultural Prorate Advisory
Commissioners, the Raisin Proration Zone number 1 and its members, and
other defendants responsible for administering the Act. 6' The State itself

62. E.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (challenging state Supreme Court prohibition
of attorney advertising); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (challenging local bar
association adoption of a fee schedule enforceable by the state bar pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court
rules).
63. E.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (challenging resale price maintenance system for liquor pricing established by the California
legislature).
64. E.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,63 (1985)
(challenging collective ratemaking by motor carriers pursuant to three state statutes explicitly authorizing
joint price setting and administered by state departments of transportation). See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 4, 226.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994); Town of Hallie v. City of Eauchire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985);
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 48 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
66. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978) (Plurality Opinion of
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. In this fragmented decision, Justice
Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens comprised the majority
with respect to part I of the opinion. Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens also joined parts II and III
Justice Brennan's opinion. Separate opinions were filed by Justice Marshall, concurring, Chief Justice
Burger, concurring in the judgment and concurring in part, Justice Stewart, dissenting, joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist and, in part by Justice Blackmun, and Justice Blackmun, dissenting. The Lafayette
case reflects the difficulty the Court has had in determining the limits of antitrust liability of
governmental entities.
67. The principle originated much earlier. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
held that the Sherman Act "forbids only those trade restraints and monopolizations that are created, or
attempted, by acts of individuals or corporations." This was the origin of the doctrine, according to the
Supreme Court in Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), also citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904). Noerr further stated that "where a restraint
upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action,
no violation of the Act can be made out" Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S. at 136. Feldman v.
Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1304 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The progressive development of the State Action
Doctrine has been to define more precisely the "valid governmental action" which should be immune
from antitrust liability.
68. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 338 (1943). Plaintiff Brown was a California raisin packer. Since
the case concerned a California citizen suing California government entities and officials, the language
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was not named as a defendant in the case69 and state sovereign immunity
under the Hans doctrine was not discussed by the trial7" or Supreme
Court.7" Had the defendant raised sovereign immunity as a defense, the
Court could have applied the Hans doctrine to dismiss the action as barred
by sovereign immunity, and the State Action Doctrine might never have
Instead, the Parker Court recognized the obvious; that
emerged.
California's raisin marketing program would be an illegal restraint of trade
if it had been planned and effectuated entirely by a "contract, combination
or conspiracy or private persons, individual or corporate." 72 What made
the Parker situation different from a traditional private restraint of trade
forbidden by the antitrust laws,7 3 however, was the entanglement of the
state in the program.
The Parker Court decided that the Congressional purpose to impose
antitrust liability on states was lacking, but assumed that Congress could
have decided otherwise.74 Finding no explicit Congressional intention to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court said:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government

of the Eleventh Amendment prohibiting suits against states by non-citizens arguably would not control,
but the Hans doctrine and subsequent cases, discussed infra notes 83 and accompanying text, make it
clear that Eleventh Amendment analysis also applies to actions by citizens against their own states.
69. For the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has not mechanically used
the identity of parties named in the pleadings as dispositive of whether or not the "state" is the real party
in interest in the suit. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (plaintiff sued the
state hospital and state department of mental health for damages, injunctive and declaratory relief). The
Court stated, "[t]his case presents the question whether the State and state agencies are subject to suit
in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief... or whether such suits are proscribed
by the Eleventh Amendment" Id. Hess v. Port Authority Transp. Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 38 (1994);
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). Generally see
the discussion accompanying note 82, infra.
70. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
71. Id. The action was solely for prospective equitable relief, to enjoin future enforcement of
the statute.
72. Parker v. Brown, 341 U.S. 350 (1943).
73. The regulatory scheme provided for pooling of 70% of all raisins produced in California by
all producers, competitors, and payment of set fees based on weight to the raisin producers. Sales of the
remainder of the raisins were also restricted. Id. Unless some other exemption applied, a naked
agreement on prices is per se unlawful. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). It is beyond the scope of this article
to opine on whether the antitrust exemption for agricultural producers and cooperatives of 15 U.S.C. §
17 and 7 U.S.C. § 291 (the Capper-Volstead Act, would have been applicable to the raisin marketing
program in Parker v. Brown).
74. Id.
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in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly
to be attributed to Congress."

Parkerwas based only in part on the language of the Sherman Act and
legislative history. In addition, the Court noted that the Sherman Act itself
refers to "persons" and not to "states."76 That statutory analysis can not
have been the only reason for the decision77 and was not. The Court found
that considerations of federalism were also important, and interference with
state sovereignty would not be implied without a clear indication of
legislative intent to do so.7" The Court's conclusion has been recognized
by commentators as a practical necessity."
To have held the Sherman Act applicable to the states could have removed
the authority of the states to create such traditional monopolies as common
carriers, to regulate for the protection of the public, or to adopt other than
a regime of competition even though the peculiar local conditions required
a different course which a busy national Congress was unlikely to

consider."0

The rationale of Parkerand its progeny is the Court's assumption that
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to reach some actions 'of
government entities, that is, Congress did not intend to abrogate all of the
states' sovereign immunity and subject states to antitrust injunctions and
treble damages in every case."' But, the Court also assumed that Congress
intended to abrogate some part of state sovereign immunity and had the
power to do so"2 Therefore, the Court created a State Action Doctrine
75. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
76. Id. at 351. 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore" and recover treble
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1997). 15 U.S.C. § 26 authorizes injunctive relief for "[a]ny person, firm,
corporation or association." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1997). 15 U.S.C. § 7 defines "person" to include
"corporations and associations" but omits to include states in the definition. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
77. The Court has, however, long recognized that states are "persons" entitled to treble damages,
Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 163 (1942) (damages), and injunctive relief, Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972), Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945),
including divestiture in merger cases, California v.American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990).
78. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 5, 221 ("To have held the
Sherman Act applicable to the states could have removed the authority of the states to create such
traditional monopolies as common carriers, to regulate for the protection of the public, or to adopt other
than a regime of competition even though peculiar local conditions required a different course that a
busy national Congress was unlikely to consider.") (footnote omitted).
79. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,
221.
80. Id.
81. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
82. The Supreme Court has not discussed state sovereign immunity in an antitrust apart from the
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which potentially subjects states to suit exposure to liability in some
situations.8 3 The rationale of Parker,therefore, must not be confused with
the rationale of Seminole Tribe. The latter case is broader and, according
to the majority, is constitutionally based. " Indeed, it essentially invalidates
the underlying reasoning of Parker, which is based on concerns of
federalism, but which balances the competing policy of competition and
theoretically subjects states to suit and liability in some situations. 5 The
ParkerCourt concluded that the state "as sovereign, imposed the restraint
as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to
prohibit."86 Thus, the Court concluded that states should be immune or
exempt from the antitrust laws when, but only when, they consciously acted
in their sovereign capacity to supplant competition.87 The State Action
Doctrine inquires whether the challenged governmental action is sufficiently
the act of a sovereign state to be entitled to the deference demanded by
federalism. 8 No such searching analysis was done, or even contemplated,
in Seminole Tribe, where the case simply announced the blanket
Constitutional rule that states are sovereign immune and are not subject to
suit in federal court.8 9 Seminole Tribe implies that Congress can not
abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal statutes enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and subject states to antitrust suit. Thus, the Doctrine is

State Action Doctrine. Major U. S. Supreme Court State Action cases decided between 1985 and 1996
include FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169 (1992); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1359 n.4 (1991) (Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and
Marshall, dissenting, in pointing out that a municipality could claim the benefit of the State Action
Doctrine only if the decision to supplant competition by regulation was made by the State itself, noted
other distinctions between states and local governments, including that local governments are not
protected by the Eleventh Amendment); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
83. Parker, 317 U.S. 341. That is, circumstances where the state has not met the two-part test
requiring a clear articulation of a state policy to displace competition and active supervision of private
parties acting pursuant to the state policy. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
84. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
85.

Parker,317 U.S. 341.

86. Id. at 352. The Court stated that "[w]e may assume also, without deciding, that Congress
could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining a stabilization program
like the present because of its effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 350.
87.

Id.

88. This distinction was suggested nearly two decades before Seminole Tribe by the D.C. Circuit,
noting that "this inquiry [into whether the state action test is satisfied] becomes necessary when an act
by a subordinate government agency is at stake, for it is well settled that not everything it does is an act
of the state as sovereign. There obviously is no need for any investigation of that sort when the action
plainly is taken in a sovereign capacity." Feldman v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 661 F.2d
1295, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
89.

Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114.
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likely to be limited to private parties acting pursuant to state regulation of
markets. 90
The Parkerdecision did not announce a precise rule to give direction
to courts, states engaged in economic regulation, and private actors
complying with state regulatory schemes, to determine when state immunity
from the antitrust laws should be accorded. The Court did, however, set out
some basic principles. First, "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring
that their action is lawful,"' second, the state may not become "a
participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of
trade," 2 and third, the "state itself [must] exercise[] its legislative authority
in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its
application." ' a The Court implied that the State must "create the
machinery" for the regulatory program, "adopt the program" and "enforce[]
it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy," and the
state program supplanting competition must be the will of the state "not the
imposition by them [the private parties] of their will upon the minority by
4
force of agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits."9
To be immune, the state, acting as a sovereign, must deliberately adopt and
enforce the restraint of trade.9"
Parker v. Brown dealt with the potential antitrust liability of state
government entities. The private parties that benefited under the raisin
regulation were not named as defendants in the original case,9 6 so the
Court did not have to decide whether the newly created State Action
Doctrine applied to protect private firms as well as states, and, if so, under
what circumstances private parties would be immune from antitrust liability.
As late as 1976, a plurality of the Court suggested that Parkerimmunized

90. As was discussed above, the majority in Seminole Tribe held that Congress lacks the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Therefore, with respect to state
defendants themselves, state antitrust immunity is not, according to the Seminole Tribe Court, based on
an implicit Congressional purpose not to impose antitrust liability on some state actions. Instead,
sovereign immunity is mandated by the Constitution itself, and Congress lacked and lacks the authority
to come to a different conclusion as to the government entities. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 352.
Id.

95. Id. Compare Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (no
immunity where the state did not supervise the prices set by private firms). See AREEDA & HOVENKAMp,
supra note 4, 9226 ("The juxtaposition of Parker and Schwegman, therefore, suggests that a state may
be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable, provided that it substitutes adequate
public control wherever it has substantially weakened competition.").
96. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
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states only, and not private parties.97 Recent cases have confirmed that the
State Action Doctrine protects private parties as well as government
entities.9" This -is clearly the correct result and promotes the two policies
that the State Action Doctrine was crafted to accommodate: Federalism and
competition. "If the federal government or a private litigant could have
enforced the antitrust laws against [private firms] . . ., effectuation of state
policy would have been thwarted just as if the state action exclusion were
never created. To avoid such a result, immunity must be granted to private
parties as well."99
The modem standard emerged in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,1°° an antitrust action by a private wine
distributor challenging California's regulation of wine sales.' ° ' The Court
adopted a two-part test to determine whether states and private parties acting
pursuant to state regulation would be immune from or subject to antitrust
liability: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively
supervised by the State itself. '"2 The Midcal two-prong test applies to
private parties acting pursuant0 to
an anticompetitive state policy as well as
3
to the state government itself.1
The first Midcal prong, is clearly satisfied by state legislation
affirmatively mandating the anticompetitive regulations and declaring that
regulation, rather than competition, is in the public interest and is the choice
of the state. State legislation must show a sufficiently clear policy to
supplant competition in order to meet the Midcal clear articulation
standard. 10 4 A state agency that adopts anticompetitive regulations must

97. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The majority of the Court, however,
thought otherwise. 428 U.S. at 603 (opinion of Burger, C.J., concurring in part); 428 U.S. at 614-15
(opinion of Stewart, Potter and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The plurality was correct in that the Parker
Court did not concern, and had no reason to address, the liability of private parties acting pursuant to
anticompetitive state regulations.
98. E.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1985).
99. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 221c.
100. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
101. The state had established fair trade regulations, requiring wine producers and wholesalers to
post their prices and not deviate from them. Wholesalers thus were prohibited from selling at discount
prices to liquor retailers. Such a system of resale price maintenance, if adopted by private businesses,
has consistently been held to be per se illegal since the rule was announced in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
102. 445 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted).
103. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985).
104. The federal courts, therefore, must determine the intent of state legislation and may have to
interpret the legislative policy. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, IN 224-225. Professors Areeda
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have been authorized to do so by the state.' s A pervasive regulatory
scheme created by the state legislature, which itself displaces free
competition, is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" because the

natural result of the regulation is anticompetitive." ° The critical inquiry
is whether the anticompetitive regulations were the "logical' '0 7 or
"foreseeable"' 0 8 result of the legislation authorizing the regulations. 9
The second prong of the Midcal test requires that the state actively
supervise the private anticompetitive conduct it authorizes because the
immunity appropriately should "shelter only the particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually further
state regulatory policies." 0 The rationale of this requirement is to
promote competition, even at the expense of deference to state sovereignty.
Private parties may not claim state action immunity for their anticompetitive
actions unless a state policy is also furthered."' This requires that the

and Hovenkamp view the ability of a state legislature to correct any errors in federal court interpretation
of the state policy by enacting later state legislation as a "safety valve." Id.
105. Agency action that is not authorized is not immune from the Sherman act and is ultra vires.
Thus, unauthorized agency actions can be enjoined under the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). See also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 3 224-225.
106. New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (legislation
requiring notice by auto manufacturers if plans to locate new dealerships into existing dealers' territories,
right of incumbent dealers to protest, and hearings, did not contain any legislative expression of explicit
intent to supplant competition). The regulatory scheme implicitly "displace[d] unfettered business
freedom" and was thus immune. Id.
107. Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985) (stating that "(w]e think it is clear that
anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad [state] authority to regulate.").
108. Id. See City of Columbia v. Orrmi Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991)
(Justice Scalia stated that "[i]t is enough, we have held, if suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable
result' of what the statute authorizes," where the issue was whether state zoning laws represented a
sufficiently clear articulation of a state policy authorizing suppression of competition by a municipality).
109. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, I 224-225.
110. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). The plaintiff surgeon, who was competing with
a local clinic, lost his privileges at a hospital in a peer review action initiated by and participated in by
his competitors. The competitors defended the surgeon's antitrust action on the ground that peer review
activities were undertaken pursuant to state regulations creating the peer review system, which included
the possibility of judicial review of peer review decisions, and were thus state action immune.
111. The requirement that the state actively supervise the private conduct serves to show that state
policy, not private interests, is being furthered and that the state is making the decisions rather than
acquiescing in an anticompetitive private conspiracy. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 226.
The basis for the requirement is, again, federalism.
The existence of a state action immunity enables states, . . . to define areas inappropriate for
market control. Moreover, the adequate supervision criterion ensures that state-federal
conflict will be avoided in those areas in which the state has demonstrated its commitment
to a program through its exercise of regulatory oversight. At the same time, it guarantees that
when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to their own devices. Rather,
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supervision by the state be significant, genuine, and not mere oversight,
monitoring, or acquiescence in restraints of trade made by and for the
benefit of private parties."' State officials must have the authority to
review, approve, and disapprove the particular anticompetitive acts of those
they supervise." 3 But the mere existence of governmental power to
supervise is not sufficient. The "state officials [must] have and exercise
[the] power . . . [and] disapprove those that fail to accord with state
policy.""' 4 The mere potential or statutory ability of state officials to
supervise regulatory programs does not constitute active supervision." 5
The state officials must exercise a deliberative function, regulating and not
merely acquiescing in private conduct." 6 The critical inquiry into active
supervision "is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient
independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices
[or other aspects of the state regulatory scheme] have been established as a
product of deliberate state intervention ....
""'
The State Action Doctrine has additional limitations, which distinguish
it from broader Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity. First, it is
clear that when a state acts as a sovereign engaged in regulating private
business, it is immune and confers state action immunity on the private
parties that it regulates and actively supervises. However, if the state entity
acts as a market participant rather than as the sovereign, antitrust immunity
may not be available. Such a distinction to promote competition would be
irrelevant under the Seminole Tribe rationale, where identification of the
defendant as a state is the sole determinative factor. Similarly, under the
State Action Doctrine, in the absence of any state policy superseding
competition, a state entity that entered into a conspiracy with private actors
would be exposed to the full sanctions of the antitrust laws, including treble

immunity will be granted only when the state has substituted its own supervision for the
economic constraints of the competitive market
Id.
112. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987) (State failure to exert
"significant control over" the private parties is not active supervision).
113. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 . A state agency or official that was not acting pursuant to a clearly
prospectively articulated state policy would be acting ultra vires, would not be immune, and could be
enjoined. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
114. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101. The ultimate ability of the state courts to review terminations of
medical privileges decisions made pursuant to the peer review regulations was not sufficient "active
supervision." Id. at 104.
115. FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
116. Direct supervision by the state Legislature or state Supreme Court is clearly sufficient but not
necessary. Active supervision by an authorized state agency is sufficient to confer immunity. AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 226.
117. Id.
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damages and injunctive relief. In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising,' the Court made it clear that:
The rationale of Parkerwas that, in light of our national commitment to
federalism, the general language of the Sherman Act should not be
interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their
governmental capacities as sovereign regulators .... [T]his immunity does
not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but
as a commercial participant in a given market." 9
The Court went on to contrast the "commercial participant" situation, where
the state is arguably a private actor, with the situation where the state is
acting as a sovereign in a purely regulatory capacity, albeit as a coconspirator with one or more of the firms regulated. The existence of a
conspiracy between a state and private party, while anticompetitive, does not
transform sovereign action entitled to immunity into unprotected private
action. Therefore, a "market participant" exception to the State Action
Doctrine may be recognized in a future case, although it was not adopted in
Omni. Such a market participant exception would be consistent with the
theory and policy of the State Action Doctrine to immunize only the actions
of the government acting as a sovereign from antitrust liability.
After Seminole Tribe the scope of sovereign immunity of states, state
departments, and agencies will not be limited by the State Action Doctrine.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, it is not relevant whether the state has a
policy to supplant competition or supervises the markets subject to state
regulation. Broad Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity will immunize
states from suit under the antitrust laws in federal courts. Private parties
acting pursuant to state authorization, indeed, at state directive or mandate,
however, are not sovereigns and therefore do not share in sovereign
immunity.
Parker v. Brown was based on the recognition that states have a
legitimate interest in regulating some markets and businesses, for example,
the business of insurance, common carriers, lawyers or other professionals,
and zoning. State governments may choose to by-pass competition and
adopt a regulatory scheme, even one that is anti-competitive, to protect the
public interest in these markets. Thus, the State Action Doctrine has the
potential to injure consumers by denying them the ability to recover against
states for antitrust injury caused by violations involving states acting in their
sovereign capacity. Unlike Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity,
the State Action Doctrine balances the possible injury to consumers against

118.
119.

499 U.S. 365 (1991) (rejecting conspiracy exception to state action immunity).
Id. at 374-75.
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the competing interest of allowing states to regulate business. ° Indeed,
if anything can be inferred from the text and legislative history of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, it is that Congress sought to protect the interests
of injured persons and promote antitrust enforcement by creating a treble
damages remedy for private plaintiffs injured by antitrust violations. "The
legislative history and case law indicate that compensation is a goal, perhaps
even the dominant goal, of antitrust's damages remedy."''
The Eleventh
Amendment bar to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over states denies
federal antitrust jurisdiction over states in all cases, thus tipping balance
between competition and sovereignty directed by the State Action Doctrine
against the interests of consumers and other plaintiffs injured by restraints
of trade.
The availability of injunctive relief against state entities was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb, 22 resolving in the affirmative the issue
of whether states could be subject to any antitrust liability.'
A majority
of the Supreme Court has not decided whether treble damages may be
awarded against a state government entity, 2 and the few decisions by

120. "No legitimate state interest would be served, however, by immunizing state conduct violative
of the antitrust laws which is not otherwise shielded by the state action doctrine. The application of
eleventh amendment immunity to private federal antitrust actions would erase forty years of case law that
has developed a proper balance between the interests of states and private citizens and would deprive
those citizens of any forum in which to pursue the private right of action conferred on them by
Congress." Harris & Kenny, supra note 55, at 651.
121. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
115, 122 (1993) (footnotes omitted). See Treble-Damages Remedy, 1986 A.B.A. SEC., ANTITRUST 1621; 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1997). The treble damages remedy was extended to the United States in its
proprietary capacity in § 4A of the Clayton Act in 1990, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15A.
122. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The defendant Virginia State Bar, a
state agency, and a county bar association were held to lack antitrust immunity in a case seeking
injunctive relief. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that the bar officials were not government
employees or officials, but rather private individuals so "the Court was concerned with 'essentially a
private anticompetitive activity' being conducted by those partially garbed as a state agency." AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 228 (citation omitted). They conclude that government entities and
officials should never be subject to treble damages liability but only to equitable remedies. Id.
123. Star Lines Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 451 F. Supp. 157, 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
124. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), affid 435 U.S.
389 (1978) (5-4 decision). The antitrust counterclaim against two cities concerning their operation of
electric power utilities sought $540 million in treble damages. The precise issue before the Court was
the legal standard for antitrust liability of a municipality, because the District Court had granted the
cities' motion to dismiss and therefore no decision on the merits or damage award against the cities was
at issue. The cities argued, however that the antitrust laws did not allow civil damages or criminal
liability to be imposed upon government entities. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan disagreed,
and that municipalities had the potential to distort "the rational and efficient allocation of resources, and
the efficiency of free markets which the regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is thought
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lower courts conflict.' 2
.Commentators have argued that neither
government entities nor officials should be subject to criminal liability or
antitrust civil damages because "[i]t is hard to believe that Congress meant
to transfer treble damages from the citizenry to those business enterprises
which claim [antitrust] injury as a result of a government agency's economic
policies" '26 and because injunctive relief would be sufficient to make
plaintiffs whole. Further, commentators have argued that if it is not possible
to construe the Sherman Act to bar legal relief but allow equitable relief
against government entities and officials, they should be entirely
immune."' However, nothing in the language of the Sherman Act limits
the type of relief that may be ordered against governmental entities in
appropriate cases.
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
DEFENSES IN ANTITRUST CASES

AND STATE ACTION

The Supreme Court has not focused on the interplay between the State
Action Doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment and the inherent conflicts
between these two doctrines in any antitrust cases naming as defendants
state actors. Goldfarb2 ' applied Parker State Action immunity, but also

noted that the State Bar had argued that it was immune under the Eleventh
Amendment. However, since the District Court had not based its decision
on that issue, the Supreme Court had no opportunity to consider the

to engender," stating that this would be a "serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection .. " Id.
at 408. Justice Stewart, dissenting, believed that damages would be improper because municipalities and
their citizens could be exposed to massive treble damage awards that they could ill afford. Id. at 440-41.
125. Duke &Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of treble damages
claim against municipalities and local officials); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (deciding that governmental action is not necessarily immune from the antitrust laws, and citing
the Parker line of cases). But see Ajax Aluminum v. Goodwill Indus., 564 F. Supp. 628, 631 (W.D.
Mich. 1983) (fimding that the State Department actively supervised the program in question, that
legislative authorization was not necessary because the defendant was not a private party but the state
itself, and deciding that a state, acting in its sovereign capacity, is immune from antitrust suit); New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363, 367-71 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that "sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act do not apply to the activities of a state" and disagreeing with the Hecht reasoning.)
(footnote omitted). But cf Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(granting judgment n.o.v., finding state action immunity, and overturning $28 million treble damage jury
award against defendant county, village and local officials), aff'd 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
126. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 228. However, at the time the treatise was
published, 1978, after Parden and Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court had held that Congress had the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See supra notes 4 & 6 and accompanying text. Areeda and
Hovenkamp also recognize that the Eleventh Amendment may be a significant bar to the award of
damages against states and state officials.
127. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 228.
128. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).

1424

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Eleventh Amendment argument.'2 9
Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Omni, 31 mentioned the Eleventh Amendment in a footnote as part of a
general discussion distinguishing municipalities, which are not protected by
the Eleventh Amendment, from states are, which are. Similarly, in City of
Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co., 3' the plurality simply observed
that the State Action Doctrine was based on deference to state sovereignty,
which could be limited only by Congress, and that such a Congressional
purpose would not lightly be implied. a2 However, Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissenting, preciently observed
the distinction between the two doctrines, stating:
The plurality today advances two reasons for holding nonetheless that the
Parker doctrine is inapplicable to municipal governments. First, the
plurality notes that municipalities cannot claim the State's sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. But this is hardly relevant to
the question of whether they are within the reach of the Sherman Act.
That question must be answered by reference to congressional intent, and
not constitutional principles that apply in entirely different situations. And
if constitutional analogies are to be looked to, a decision much more
directly related to this case than the Eleventh Amendment is National
League of Cities v. Usery. That case, like this one, involved an exercise
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and held that States and
their political subdivisions must be given equal deference.' 33
IMPACT OF SEMINOLE TRIBE ON ANTITRUST THEORY AND PRACTICE

The relationship between Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and
antitrust State Action immunity illuminates theoretical issues of the
appropriate limitations of state sovereignty in a federal system. The
distinctions between the two doctrines as applied will have an impact on
future antitrust cases that is more than purely theoretical, although it should
not be overstated. State governmental entities named as defendants in
antitrust actions have generally been found to have met the requirements of
the State Action Doctrine, and thus have been entitled to immunity' 34

129. Id.
130. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 499 U.S. 365, 390 n.4 (1991).
131. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
132. The plurality stated that municipalities are shielded under the State Action Doctrine only if
they are acting pursuant to a State policy. Id. at 409-13. The majority rejected any relationship to the
Eleventh Amendment, pointing out that cities are not sovereign, and therefore are not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment protection. Id. at 412 (citing Lincoln County v. Lunning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890)).
133. 435 U.S. at 430 (citations omitted).
134. Private parties have not been so successful. For example, the State Action Doctrine did not
immunize the private defendants in other cases. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976)
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However, some important antitrust cases might have been decided
differently if state sovereign immunity had been understood as an absolute
bar to suits against states in federal court. 3 ' In these cases, the relief
sought was injunctive, but nothing in the text of the antitrust laws prohibits
the award of treble damages in appropriate cases. 136 The Eleventh
Amendment, as defined by the majority in Seminole Tribe, has rendered
moot the possibility of state antitrust liability for damages, essentially
swamping the State Action Immunity Doctrine with respect to suits against
states, state departments and state agencies. 137 Private firms are not
sovereigns entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, therefore, the only
immunity that remains available to private defendants in antitrust actions
challenging anticompetitive actions taken pursuant to state law or policy is
the State Action Doctrine.
There is no reason to doubt the continued availability of State Action
immunity to private defendants in antitrust actions if all the requirements of
the doctrine have been met. 138 The State Action Doctrine was developed
on the theory that Congress intended the antitrust laws to reach activity
regulated by the states only in limited circumstances, because competition
was an important value but that the ability of state governments to supplant
competition and regulate commerce was an equally important, but
sometimes conflicting value. Congress wrote the antitrust laws in broad
constitution-like language with the expectation that the federal courts would
develop a body of antitrust law by accretion as common law has

(the program to provide free light bulbs to customers of the utility, regulated by the Michigan Public
Service Commission, was not immune because the state had not actually considered the program);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Patrick v. Burget,
486 U.S. 94 (1988) (hospital peer review system was not actively supervised by the state so the
defendant doctors were not immune).
135. E.g. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479
U.S. 335 (1987) (New York's liquor price regulations were not State Action immune because the state

did not actively supervise the prices). Injunctive relief could have been sought against state officials
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
136. Commentators Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that treble damages should not be available
against government entities and public officials, even if the officials and public entities had participated
in antitrust violations with private parties. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 228. The text of
the antitrust laws, however, does not appear to be permissive or to give courts discretion to deny
damages to a prevailing plaintiff, regardless of the identity of the defendant: "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained ....
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
137.

As has been discussed above, supra note 26 and accompanying text, Exparte Young and its

progeny authorize prospective injunctive relief against government officials.
138.

The state government must affirmatively express its intent to supplant competition with

regulation and actively supervise private firms acting pursuant to the state policy. California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1980).
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evolved. 39 Since Parker, it has been clear that federal courts believed
they had the power to strike a balance between competition and state
sovereignty. The Supreme Court has now declared that the balance always
tips in favor of state sovereignty and states are immune from suit in federal
court. Thus, under Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment protects states
and state entities from damages liability under the antitrust laws even if their
regulation is not "affirmatively authorized" or "actively supervised. "'44
But it is important to note that Seminole Tribe did not preclude, explicitly
or by necessary implication, the validity of the State Action analysis that
balances interests of state sovereignty and competition with respect to
private defendants acting pursuant to state regulation. Therefore, private
parties acting pursuant to state policies should continue to be subject to the
State Action Doctrine, immunized only when the state has affirmatively
expressed an intention to supplant competition and actively supervises firms
acting pursuant thereto. However, the symmetry that had characterized the
State Action Doctrine, in that the immunity protected both the state entities
and the private firms acting under state direction, has now been unbalanced.
The legal analysis for immunity from antitrust damages will diverge into
different standards for states and private firms. Formerly, states and private
parties were subject to the same legal standard for antitrust immunity and
were exposed to the same risk of injunctive relief and, possibly, treble
damages. Thus, state governments had a strong incentive to articulate the
public interest that they sought to advance when supplanting the competitive
marketplace. States were required to consider carefully whether competition
could achieve the state's goals or whether the state should foreclose
competition, because only a clear articulation of state policy would satisfy
the first prong of Midcal. Then, state agencies and departments had a
similar incentive to actually and actively supervise the private parties acting
pursuant to the state policy, necessary to satisfy the second prong of Midcal.
Thus, states had two incentives: To promote their vision of the public
interest, including by foreclosing competition in appropriate
circumstances,' 4' and to protect the state from liability by following the
requirements of the State Action Doctrine for antitrust immunity. The best

139. "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United States v. Topco
Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
140. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106-07.
141. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, In 221,223 observing that opinions of observers
are mixed concerning the ability of states to decide when regulation should replace competition, to
impose the best regulatory scheme, and to decide based upon the public interest rather than special
interests.
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evidence of the care with which the states acted is the high success rate of
State Action defenses. Seminole Tribe's holding that Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity precludes suits against states in federal court'42 and
the state immunity may not be abrogated by Congress eliminates the latter
incentive. Although the primary incentive still exists and conscientious state
legislators should continue to limit competition only when necessary.
However, the risk of damages exposure is eliminated. States should
continue to follow the requirements of the State Action Doctrine necessary
to provide antitrust immunity for private parties, however, as the only way
to make the states' own regulatory policies effective. 43
Broad Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for states means that
the State Action Doctrine is most necessary for private actors, increasing
their responsibility to monitor the actions of state legislatures and agencies.
In order to be the beneficiaries of State Action immunity, private firms have
an incentive to police government activity to ensure that the state has
satisfied the requirements of the State Action immunity Doctrine, e.g. that
the state's legislative expression of intent to supplant competition is
adequate and that the state agency charged with enforcing the policy has the
authority to supervise private action and actually does so. Such monitoring
and lobbying will likely be difficult, expensive, and have unpredictable
results because it is difficult for private firms know in advance what
legislation is being considered by state legislatures and the justifications for
the legislation. Private actors are privileged to lobby the legislative'" and

142. A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997).
143. Empirical evidence on whether states will strictly follow the requirements of the State Action
Doctrine necessary to provide immunity to private firms is, of course, lacking at this time. The courts
will answer the question in their decisions on defendants' motions to dismiss based on State Action
immunity arguments. If states continue to adhere to the strict requirements of the Doctrine, the such
motions should continue to be granted at about the same rate as before Seminole Tribe. If, however,
states lack the incentives to protect private parties because they are not themselves exposed to antitrust
liability, we would expect to see the denial of more motions to dismiss on State Action immunity
grounds and a corresponding increase in liability of private defendants.
144. Generally, activities that constitute petitioning to the government are immune from antitrust
liability, even if the result sought is to restrict competition. The doctrine originated with Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), which concerned a
public campaign by an association of railroads to obtain legislation that would limit competition from
the trucking industry. The campaign was directly aimed at destroying the trucking industry as a
competitive force. Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws did not apply to the
activity. Id. at 145. Although the opinion does not specify whether the basis for decision was the First
Amendment right to petition the government or the court's determination that the legislative intent of
Congress in enacting the Sherman Act was not enacted to reach political activity, it is clear that most
concerted lobbying activities will be immune from antitrust condemnation. Noerr cautioned, however,
that "sham" petitioning was not immune from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 144.
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executive'4 5 branches,' and self protection may make such lobbying
activities a necessity. Equally important is the second Midcal prong,
requiring the state entity actively to supervise the private firms. However,
the risks of agency capture may be increased by the need for private parties
to be more vigilant to ensure that any state regulatory legislation contains
the necessary affirmative expressions and to encourage regulators to actively
supervise. 4 7 Finally, the practical difficulties of forcing a reluctant state
regulator to regulate are apparent.
A final issue is the practical: Plaintiffs will no longer have the option
to join the private and the governmental actor in an antitrust case.
Moreover, if the private defendant(s) are beyond the jurisdiction of the court
or are judgment-proof, the private plaintiff has no treble damages
remedy.'"" State officials, however, may be sued under the Ex parte
Young doctrine for injunctive relief.

145. In a case involving efforts by coal mine operators and unions to influence the U.S. Secretary
of Labor to increase certain minimum wages, the Supreme Court held that Noerr rule also applies to
efforts to influence administrative governmental decisions. Id.
Like legislative lobbying, the goal
sought by the concerted action may be to eliminate competition. United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
146. Sham petitioning is not protected. Professional Real Estate Investors Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993), the most recent decision of the Supreme Court on the
Noerr doctrine, clarifies the test for sham petitioning in the judicial context. Justice Thomas, writing for
the Court, stated:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits .... Only if the challenged litigation is objectively
meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part
of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor..." through the
"use [of] the governmental process - as opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anticompetitive weapon."
508 U.S. at 60-61 (citations omitted).
147. See John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1986); William Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique
of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981).
148. The treble damages remedy and other antitrust rules such as the prohibition of suits by
indirect purchasers, were adopted, in part to promote private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Private
plaintiffs are so important to the promotion of competition, in bringing actions for injunctions and treble
damages, that they have been described as "private attorneys general." California v. American Stores
Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) ("Private enforcement of the Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was
an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting competition"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) ("Moreover, the purpose of giving private parties trebledamage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the
high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws."); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317 (1965) (it is plain that in section 5(b) Congress meant to assist private
litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust actions).

1997]

ALTERING THE BALANCE

1429

The State Action Doctrine required federal courts to balance competing
factors: deference to state sovereignty in the interest of federalism and
protection of competition mandated by the antitrust laws. The principles of
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, as adopted in Seminole
Tribe, render the protection of the narrower State Action Doctrine
unnecessary for state entities and eliminate competition as a consideration.
CONCLUSION

In the post-Seminole Tribe world, the legal analysis in situations where
states have chosen regulation over competition, supplanting the free
functioning of markets, will diverge depending upon the identity of the
defendant. If a state, its agencies, or departments are the named defendants,
the broader Eleventh Amendment analysis controls and claims for damages
against government entities must be dismissed on the ground of sovereign
immunity. If the defendant is a private firm, the narrower State Action
Doctrine, which has been crafted to balance true exercise of state
sovereignty against the goal of competition, provides immunity for private
defendants. As a policy matter, the State Action Doctrine should continue
to protect private parties operating pursuant to a state regulatory scheme
because immunity for those regulated is essential for the success of any state
regulatory program, although the risk of agency capture may be increased.
Finally, the more limited State Action immunity available to private firms
will force them to monitor the state regulators to ensure that the balancing
process between sovereign exercise and competition contemplated by the
State Action Doctrine is performed. 49

149. In the year since the Seminole Tribe decision, no reported antitrust decision in which a state
or state agency was named as a defendant has been found. Cases against private firms continue to apply
the State Action Doctrine. Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland General Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427
(9th Cir. 1997).

